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1.1	Background of Education in Tanzania
The pivotal role of education in the development of any nation cannot be over emphasized. It is evident that if any country, Tanzania inclusive, has to achieve higher levels of economic growth and productivity it has to adequately invest in education, and in secondary education in particular due to its huge multiplier effects on the education system and the economy as a whole. These effects include;
(a)	Modern economies require the supply of educated and trainable labour force with secondary education as a minimum qualification.
(b)	Secondary education is a necessary condition for economic competitiveness in the context of globalization and liberalization.
(c)	Secondary education is essential for the improvement of the quality and retention in primary education.
(d)	Secondary education is one of the major components of the Poverty Reduction Strategy.
(e)	Secondary education has huge externalities of social benefits, such as improvement of health standards, mitigation of fertility rates, reduction in infant mortality, containment of the spread of HIV and AIDS, and greater social participation in democratization and development processes.
(f)	Expansion of secondary education especially at advanced level is necessary in order to enlarge the supply of students for expansion of tertiary and higher education. 
(g) Secondary education is an essential foundation for the human resources required to build a competitive economy.
(h)	In an information and technological era with globalization and liberalisation of markets, secondary education develops and reinforces the capacity for continuous learning and updating of individual and collective capacities and national competitiveness.
(i)	Chances for achieving gender balance in tertiary and higher education depend on the number of girls’ graduate of secondary education. Thus, secondary education occupies a strategic place for future growth and economic development of the country.

Knowing the benefits of secondary education, the ministry of education in 1995, through its Education and Training Policy (ETP), stated clearly the main purposes of secondary education in Tanzania. These are; (i)	To Consolidate and broaden the scope of ideas, knowledge, skills and concepts already acquired at primary education level.
(ii)	To prepare students for tertiary, higher, vocational, technical and professional education and training.
(iii)	To prepare students for the world of work

Education system in Tanzania has passed through different eras, each era being influenced by the political state of the country and the objectives of the education being offered. These periods are;

(i)	Colonial Period/era
The first colonial masters, i.e. Germany, created a three-tiered system of education. Provision of Education was a primary obligation of the colonial government but Missionaries were also encouraged to create schools for indigenous population.  
The Objectives of the education offered during the colonial era were;
(a)	Government schools aimed at producing few individuals (clerks, tax collectors, interpreters, artisans and craftsmen) who will serve at lower posts in the colonial government and who will remain loyal to the colonial masters. 
(b)	To produce skilled workers for the German colonial enterprise. 
(c)	Missionary schools aimed at producing westernized Christian converts, alienated from their own traditional culture. This led to most educated Africans to become hostile to traditional chiefs at independence.                                                      The Germans laid a small but solid foundation for Tanzania's educational system. They built a number of schools and progressively increased enrollment of students in the attempt to achieve their educational objectives.Within the first 20 years of German colonialism and prior to World War I, the Germans built 60 nebenschulen (primary schools) which offered courses in reading, writing and arithmetic for three years; 9 hauptschulen that offered 2 additional years of vocational training and one oberschule (high school) which was built in Tanga and offered clerical, industrial and teacher training courses. 

Table 1.1 below summarizes the level of education in terms of number of schools and enrollment for 11 years of German rule before WW I. From the table it is evident that missionaries educated the overwhelming majority of Tanganyika pupils during the German colonial era. In 1914, more than 95 percent of students enrolled in Tanganyika's schools were in mission schools.
The German system of education put emphasis on practical education and health improvement. When the Germans were defeated during the World War I, Tanganyika fell under the administration of Britain as a mandate territory, under a League of Nations. The British adopted the German educational policy of cooperation with mission schools in the fight against illiteracy. They allowed missionaries to play a major role in education and subsidized schools; this gave them a greater control over the curriculum.

Britain's main educational task, as Tanganyika was a trust territory, was to develop the people of Tanganyika, as far as possible, on their own lines and in accordance with their own values and customs. The British government needed to educate the children of the local elite to ensure that their policy of indirect rule works. They opened a special school at Tabora in 1924 for sons of chiefs with the aim of producing future administrators, clerks, and artisans. They created an experimental government school at Malangali whereby Africans were to be helped to preserve and modify their own culture until a satisfactory adjustment was made to the Europeanized environment. 

Missionaries denounced this school on the grounds that tribal elders were using it to inculcate pagan, non-Christian beliefs. Their hostility caused the school to fail. Under the same grounds, Missionaries opposed other native authority schools paid for by African chiefs to train their own elite. These schools ultimately failed too. The missionaries' goals were to produce devout, educated Christians, they were not concerned with manpower needs and they devoted much attention to vocational training. The British government, on the other hand, wanted to produce only as many graduates as it planned to hire for existing work.

Table 1.1 Number of schools in Tanganyika during German colonial era. 




Source: Ministry of Education Website (www.moe.org.tz (​http:​/​​/​www.moe.org.tz​))

(ii)	Independence Period
Immediately after independence Tanzanian education system continued to be of the colonial type. The key function remained to be that of producing civil servants to serve at different posts in the independent Tanzania. Still majority of Tanzanians were denied of education and the level of ignorance was very high.

(iii)	Post Independence Period
Due to a growing need of a more civilized society and the influence of the political ideology of “Socialism and Self-Reliance (the famous ‘Siasa ya Ujamaa na Kujitegemea’)”, the education system had to be revised. The main objective of education was to be that of preparing people to live a better life and fight the three national enemies i.e. poverty, ignorance and diseases. Education system then had to follow the educational philosophies of “Education for Self-reliance” and “Adult Education”, introduced by the first president and the father of the nation Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere after analyzing the status of education and the level of ignorance in the independent Tanzania. 

These two educational philosophies greatly influenced the educational system i.e. the type of education that had to be adopted in the post-independent Tanzania. Briefly, the influence of the two educational philosophies on the education system in Tanzania can be explained as under;  

(a) Education for Self-reliance
The philosophy of Education for Self-Reliance was contained in the Arusha Declaration and basically it:
(i)	Makes a critique of the inadequacies and inappropriateness of colonial education.
(ii)	Outlines the kind of society the United Republic of Tanzania is trying to build.
(iii)	Examines some salient features of the education system that existed around 1967 in the light of newly declared goals and strategy of socialist development.
(iv)	Proposes changes designed to transform the education system in order to make it more relevant and appropriate in serving the needs and goals of a socialist society with predominantly rural economy.

According to Nyerere, the founder of the philosophy of education for self-reliance, colonial education was based on the assumption of a colonialist and capitalist society, and was therefore designed to transmit the values of the colonizing power and to train individuals for the service of the colonial state. It induced attitudes of subservience, human inequality, individualism and emphasized white-collar skills. The content of colonial education was largely alien and the entire education system was organized by racial segregation.
Nyerere analysed four basic features of the Tanzanian education system that existed in 1967. He was particularly concerned about how it discouraged the integration of pupils into society as a whole and promoted attitudes of inequality, intellectual arrogance and individualism among those who entered the school system. He found that;
(i)	Formal education is basically elitist in nature, catering to the needs and interests of the very small proportion of those who manage to enter the hierarchical pyramid of formal schooling. “We have not until now questioned the basic system of education which we took over at the time of independence. We have never done that because we have never thought about education except in terms of obtaining teachers, engineers, administrators, etc. Individually and collectively we have in practice thought of education as a training for the skills required to earn high salaries in the modern sector of our economy” (Nyerere, 1968b, p. 267).
(ii)	The education system divorces its participants from the society for which they are supposed to be trained.
(iii)	The system breeds the notion that education is synonymous with formal schooling and people are judged and employed on the basis of their ability to pass examinations and acquire paper qualifications.
(iv)	The system does not involve its students in productive work. Such a situation deprives society of their much-needed contribution to the increase in national economic output and also breeds among the students contempt for manual work.

According to Nyerere, education must serve the following functions; it must serve the common good and foster the social goals of living together and working together, it must help in the development of a society in which all members share its resources fairly equally and it must inculcate a sense of commitment to society. In addition to the inculcation of social values, Nyerere proposed three principles and interconnected changes in the organizational structure of education; these are the entry age into primary school; the content of the curriculum itself and the organisation of the schools. 

The primary school age entry was raised from 5 or 6 years to 7 years so that the student is older, more responsible and more mature on leaving school. Primary education was restructured in such a way that it became a complete education by itself, rather than simply a preparation for secondary education. Similarly secondary education was not simply a preparation for higher education.  The major purpose of the education system should therefore be to prepare people for a meaningful and productive life, and for service in the villages and rural areas.

Another change that Nyerere proposed in the organizational structure of schools is that schools must become both social and economic centres for the local communities, so as to make them an integral part of the society and economy. “Each school should have, as an integral part of it, a farm or workshop which provides the food eaten by the community, and makes some contribution to the national income. This is not a suggestion that a school farm or workshop should be attached to every school for training purposes. It is a suggestion that every school should also be a farm (Nyerere, 1968b, p. 283)”. 

Such a reorganization of schools involved both pedagogical and attitudinal implications. It contributed to the integration of theory with practice as well as the integration of mental with manual labour. The assessment of student performance had to take into account both academic abilities and the work done for the school and community. In terms of societal attitudes and values, students would learn the meaning of living together and working together for the good of all. In this way, their commitment to the development of their own society would be strengthened. 

In summary, Education for Self-Reliance proposed and brought the following changes in the educational system in Tanzania:
1.	It proposed that education should be oriented to rural life.
2.	Teachers and students should engage together in productive activities and students should participate in the planning and decision-making process of organizing these activities.
3.	Productive work should become an integral part of the school curriculum and provide meaningful learning experience through the integration of theory and practice.
4.	Examination should be downgraded.
5.	Children should begin school at seven years so that they would be old enough and sufficiently mature to engage in self-reliant and productive work when they leave school.
6.	Primary education should be complete in itself rather than merely serving as a means to higher education.
7.	Students should be self-confident and co-operative, and develop critical and inquiring minds.   

(b)	Adult Education, Lifelong learning and Education for Liberation
Nyerere’s philosophy on adult education, lifelong learning and education for liberation is in many ways a natural development of his ideas embodied in Education for Self-Reliance. Nyerere’s definition of adult education is very broad but it emphasizes the need for social change. According to him, “Adult education incorporates anything which enlarges men’s understanding, activates them, and helps them to make their own decisions and to implement those decisions for themselves. It includes training, but it is much more than training. It includes what is generally called ‘agitation’ but it is much more than that. It includes organization and mobilization, but it goes beyond them to make powerful (Nyerere, 1978, p, 30). 

The philosophy of adult education and lifelong learning had three main functions. The first function was to arouse consciousness and critical awareness among the people about the need for and possibility of change. Quoting Nyerere himself; “The first function of adult education is to inspire both a desire for change and an understanding that change is possible. For a belief that poverty or suffering is ‘the will of God’ and that man’s only task is to endure, is the most fundamental of all the enemies of freedom” (Nyerere, 1978, p, 29).

The second function of adult education was to help people to determine the nature of the change they want and how to bring it about. And the third function of adult education was to help people understand the national policies of socialism and self-reliance. These educational philosophies; education for self-reliance and Adult Education, Lifelong learning and Education for Liberation; influenced much the educational system of Tanzania from the time of the proclamation of the Arusha declaration. It changed the perception of people about education; it affected the way in which education was delivered and modeled the society to suit the political ideology advocated by the national/political leaders.

Schools were integrated and became part and parcel of the society, students learned skills which were of great importance to the survival and well being of the whole society and education was practical oriented.    

(iv) Globalization Period 
In the Globalization period, education has come to be an economic and social productive investment. The rise of the global economy has caused intensified economic competition across national boundaries and many nations have viewed education as a way to nurture their human capital for both economic and societal needs.  Indeed, the emergency of the knowledge – based economy around the world has been the key ingredient of this economic dimension of globalization and education is playing an important role in maintaining national competitiveness in the global economy. The process of globalization has promoted a new imperative for education, with emphasis on transnational skills or competences, such as the mastery of an international language (like English), mastery of information and communications technology, as well as that of information processing, problem solving, creative and critical thinking, and due to this education professionals are expected to prepare students for national and international competition in the global economic race. 

Nowadays and indeed even in the future society, knowledge workers rather than manual workers contribute to a greater percent of the wage earning employees; and due to this education has got an important role in maintaining the national competitiveness in the global economy. But owing to the rapid flow of information and the unprecedented growing pace of high technology, knowledge becomes easily obsolete in a very short period of time, and hence continuing and lifelong education, learning and training in different roles and at different levels have now assumed growing urgency.  

Consequently, public educational budgets have increased dramatically from 1980’s to today increasing the burden of providing education to the government.  However adverse economic conditions and competition from other public sectors for public funds have led to a slow – down in the growth of government expenditure on education.  This has been aggravated by the tendency for educational cost per student to keep on rising without any concomitant improvement in productivity or educational quality.
Globalization therefore created a need for the education system to be structured in such a way that it prepares students for national and international competition in the global economic race together with making education available to majority and in the international standards. This restructuring of the education system had also to take into account the need for reducing the cost of providing education. Privatization (which is the process of moving from less public ownership, financing and or control to more private ones) was considered to be the only way of tackling this problem as it reduces the running costs by shifting most of the costs from the state to the users. Indeed privatization has been brought into play in many sectors of the economy and society because it has been widely advocated as a mechanism to improve efficiency, cater for pluralistic, make institutions more accountable to their clients and reduce government expenditures (Bray, 1996).  

Due to this advocacy, the government of Tanzania decided to privatize the education system in 1980’s i.e. it allowed private individuals to open and run schools following either national curriculum, international curriculum like Cambridge, Edexel, etc or both. The mushrooming of these private schools created another problem of management and control of the educational standards. We have experienced a dramatic drop/decline in the educational standards as reflected in the performance of students in the national Form IV and Form VI examinations. Can the cause of this decline be related in any way to the increase in the number of private schools? What is the management structure of the private schools and what role does it play in the teaching-learning process and performance of students in the schools? This project is trying to find answers to these questions.
1.1.2	Background history of School Boards
Board governance/corporate governance has been defined differently by different scholars, Sir Adrian Cadbury (The committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance) defined corporate governance as the system by which companies are directed and controlled’; the World Bank, (2000) defined it as the system concerned with holding the balance between economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals with the aim of aligning as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society”. 
	
Corporate governance has been widely studied and identified as an important condition framework affecting organizational performance and operating efficiency. It exerts a strong influence on resource allocation and impacts on the behaviour and performance of firms, innovative activity and entrepreneurship. 

Board governance has assumed critical importance and has assumed major publicity in these days of political pluralism. It has been seen as a vital ingredient in the maintenance of a dynamic balance between the need for order and equality in society, the efficient production and delivery of goods and services, accountability in the use of power, the protection of human rights and freedoms, and the maintenance of an organized corporate framework within which each citizen can contribute fully towards finding innovative solutions to common problems. Due to this board governance today is recognized as a leadership process in addition to the more traditional function of management oversight. As once Millstein and MacAvoy said, the leadership behaviour of board members is a crucial determinant of board effectiveness and performance (Millstein and MacAvoy, 1998).
The governance of schools by school boards started in USA almost 200 years ago. Selectmen in Massachusetts decided to appoint local committees responsible for education in order to separate this authority from other municipal responsibilities (Danzberger, 1998). This system of school governance expanded beyond Massachusetts to the rest of the USA and remains the basis of educational governance system today. 

The role of school boards early in their existence was strictly one of management, i.e. oversight and control. In the late nineteenth century, reforms were introduced in the structure of school boards, the local educational governance was moved to a more centralized bodies. The intention of this change was to model school boards after corporate boards, to focus the work of school boards on the needs of the entire community and to move school boards closer to a broader leadership role. Currently the changing context for public education requires a shift in the role from management to leadership, centered on setting a direction for the future. Thus the role of the effective school boards is to establish a vision, focus on student achievement, provide oversight, work at the policy level, operate as a team, avoid micromanagement, build community support and align resources to goals. 
Recognizing the importance of board governance, the Ministry of Education requires that each secondary school established in Tanzania to be governed by a school board. This board should be comprised of members from different disciplines (adhering to the Capital Markets and Securities Act of 1994 that put in place the principles of good corporate governance practices in Tanzania which are to be followed by all public listed companies) and the functions of the school board will include:
(i)	To oversee the implementation of school development plans.
(ii)	To advise Councils, Regions and the Centre on schools management.
(iii)	To approve school development plans and budgets
(iv)	To deal with disciplinary cases of students.
(v)	To advise the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training and TSC on disciplinary cases of teachers.

1.2	Statement of the Problem
Private academic institutions have mushroomed in the past thirty years following the liberalization of economy and privatization policy adopted by the government of Tanzania since 1980’s due to the global move towards liberal economic system. These private institutions contribute to a greater percentage on the total employment of the citizens of the country and contribute a substantial percentage to the GDP through direct taxes which they pay to the government and through taxes paid by the employees of these institutions in the form of PAYE. Also they help in reducing the government expenditure on education, which, due to the necessity of education in this era of global economy and great emphasis on science and technology, would otherwise be eating a greater part of the government revenue.  

Despite the benefits offered by the private schools, in terms of income generation to the government and providing opportunity to children who would otherwise not have gotten a chance to go to school due to limited number of government schools, it has been envisaged that the performance of these schools in national examinations, especially at the advanced level has been poor compared to the costs incurred by parents in terms of school fees, stationeries and other expenses (See Table 1.2 and 1.3 below showing the performance of private and public schools in advanced level exams for five years). From the data it is evident that the percentage pass in government schools is higher compared to those of private schools. This poor performance has raised much concern from different stakeholders of education including the government, parents and potential employers of people graduating from these schools. Many studies have been conducted and a number of reasons have been put forward trying to explain the observed poor performance of students in private secondary schools but the role played by the school board of directors on improving education standards has yet to be investigated.  Due to this the researcher found that there is a need to examine the effectiveness of Board governance on academic institutions performance with reference to private secondary schools in Arusha municipality. 

Table 1.2: Performance of Government secondary schools of Arusha Municipality in Advanced level examinations (ACSEE) from 2007 - 2011
Year	No. of Students who scored	Total






Source: NECTA website (2011)

Figure 1.1: Graphical representation of the Performance of government schools in Form VI exams
Source: NECTA website (2011)


Table 1.3: Performance of Private secondary schools of Arusha Municipality in
      Advanced level examinations (ACSEE) from 2007 - 2011
Year	No. of Students who scored	Total number of students










Figure 1.2: Graphical representation of the Performance of private schools in 
	Form VI exams
Source: NECTA website (2011)

1.3	Objectives of the study
1.3.1	General Objective 
The general objective of this study was to determine the effectiveness of Board Governance in academic institutions performance, a case of private secondary schools in Arusha.

1.3.2	Specific Objectives
The specific objectives of this study were:
1.	To examine how the Board of Directors work in private secondary school boards in Arusha municipality to facilitate learning process.
2.	To examine the structure of the private secondary school boards and its effect on student’s performance.
3.	To determine the difference, if any, in governance structure between the private secondary school boards and public secondary schools of Arusha municipality

1.4	Research questions
The research questions that guided this study were:
1.	How do Boards of Directors work to enhance learning process in private secondary schools in Arusha municipality?
2.	What is the structure of the private secondary school boards? How does it affect the teaching – learning process in private secondary schools of Arusha municipality? 
3.	What is the difference between the governance structure of the private secondary school boards and that of the public schools?

1.5	Significance of the study 
By examining the structure of private secondary school boards, how these boards work in facilitating smooth running of schools, and by highlighting the positive areas and condemning the areas that reduce the effectiveness of the board performance and performance of schools, the study will benefit the ministry of education and other education stakeholders by ensuring that proper management structure is set.

The study also provides a comparison between the governance structure of non-educational institutions and academic institutions thus acting as a link between the two. In addition, the findings are expected to be useful to work organizations, policy makers, donors, Non-Government Organization and private institutions who are devoted at promoting good corporate governance in education sector. 

The researcher benefited from the whole exercise of this study because it made him conversant with conducting research, and also gave him deep understanding of corporate governance, its importance and how it is being exercised in academic institutions. The study will also provide an area for further research on the role of corporate governance in the performance of schools therefore it will become a reference point for future scholars.  

1.6	Limitations of the study
During the conducting of this study and especially on data collection the following limitations were encountered:
	Some of the directors were not ready to meet and be interviewed; this reduced the sample size intended.
	Most of the directors had limited time to complete filling the questionnaire.
	Some directors were afraid to fill the questionnaire thinking that the researcher had bad intentions to their institutions. 






Corporate governance has attracted various definitions reflecting its importance and enormous studies done on it.  Metrick and Ishii (2002) define corporate governance from the perspective of the investor as ‘‘both the promise to repay a fair return on capital invested and the commitment to operate a firm efficiently given investment’’. Metrick and Ishii argue that firm level governance may be more important in developing markets with weaker institutions as it helps to distinguish firms. Cadbury Committee (1992) defines corporate governance as ‘‘the system by which companies are directed and controlled’’. 

On the other hand, Rajan and Zingales (1998) define a governance system as ‘‘the complex set of constraints that shape the ex post bargaining over the quasi rent registered by the firm’’. In Mayer (1997), corporate governance is seen as concerned with ways of bringing the interests of investors and managers into line and ensuring that firms are run for the benefit of investors. Deakin and Hughes, (1997), see corporate governance as a process that is concerned with the relationship between the internal governance mechanisms of corporations and society’s conception of the scope of corporate accountability. It has also been defined by Keasey et al. (1997) to include ‘‘the structures, processes, cultures and systems that engender the successful operation of organisations’’.

From these definitions, it may be stated more generally that different systems of corporate governance will embody what are considered to be legitimate lines of accountability by defining the nature of the relationship between the company and key corporate stakeholders. Thus, corporate governance describes how companies ought to be run, directed and controlled (Cadbury Committee, 1992). It is about supervising and holding to account those who direct and control management. 

According to Anthony Kyereboah-Coleman and Nicholas Biekpe (2004) the theory on corporate governance stems from the thesis “The Modern Corporation and Private Property” by Berle and Means (1932). The thesis highlights a fundamental agency problem in modern firms where there is a separation between management and finance. These firms are run by professional managers (agents), who are accountable to dispersed shareholders (principals). The question that gave rise to corporate governance is how to ensure that managers follow the interests of shareholders in order to reduce cost associated with principal-agent theory. To do that, the principals have to deal with two problems. First, they face an adverse selection problem: that is, they must select the most capable managers. Second, they are also confronted with a moral hazard problem: that is how to adequately motivate the managers to put forth the appropriate effort and make decisions aligned with shareholders interests.

Jensen and Meckling (1976) further define agency relationship and identify agency costs. Agency relationship, according to them, is a contract under which ‘‘one or more persons (principal) engage other person (agent) to perform some service on their behalf, which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent’’. The scenario normally generates a conflict of interests. This conflict of interests between managers or controlling shareholder, and outside or minority shareholders refers to the tendency that the former may extract perks out of a firm’s resources and be less interested to pursue new profitable ventures. Agency costs in this case include monitoring expenditures by the principal such as auditing, budgeting, control and compensation systems, bonding expenditures by the agent and residual loss due to divergence of interests between the principal and the agent. Usually, the share price paid by shareholders (principal) reflects such agency costs. 
	
To increase firm value, one must therefore reduce agency costs. This is one way to view the linkage between corporate governance and corporate performance. Fama (1980) aptly comments that separation of ownership and control can be explained as a result of ‘‘efficient form of economic organization’’. One difference between firms’ corporate governance systems is the difference in the ownership and control that exist across these firms. Indeed, systems of corporate governance can be distinguished according to the degree of ownership and control and the identity of controlling shareholders. While some systems are characterized by wide dispersed ownership (outside systems), others tend to exhibit concentrated ownership of control (inside systems). In the outside systems of corporate governance, there exist a basic conflict of interest between strong managers and widely dispersed weak shareholders. On the other hand, in inside systems, the basic conflict is between controlling shareholders (or block holders) and weak minority shareholders.

As it stands today corporate governance is the only promising solution to mitigate the agency problem and increase the efficiency of companies and expand the chances of economic advancement. Good Corporate Governance is necessary in order to:
♦ Attract investors – both local and foreign – and assure them that their investments will be secure and efficiently managed, and in a transparent and accountable process.
♦ Create competitive and efficient companies and business enterprises.
♦ Enhance the accountability and performance of those entrusted to manage corporations.
♦ Promote efficient and effective use of limited resources.

Without efficient companies or business enterprises, any country will not create wealth or employment. Without investment, companies will stagnate and collapse. If business enterprises do not prosper, there will be no economic growth; no employment, no taxes paid and invariably the country will not develop. Countries therefore need well-governed and managed business enterprises that can attract investments, create jobs and wealth and remain viable, sustainable and competitive in the global market place. Good corporate governance, hence, becomes a prerequisite for national economic development.

The importance of good governance system was also shown by the Global Corporate Governance Forum which noted in its mission statement that: “Corporate Governance has become an issue of worldwide importance. The Corporations have a vital role to play in promoting economic development and social progress. They are the engine of growth internationally, and increasingly responsible for providing employment, public and private services, goods and infrastructure. The efficiency and accountability of the corporations is now a matter of both private and public interest, and governance has, thereby, come to the head of the international agenda.”
Also the Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance in its publication “CACG Guidelines – Principles for Corporate Governance in the Commonwealth”, states:” The globalization of the market place within this context has ushered in an era where the traditional dimensions of corporate governance defined within local laws, regulations and national priorities are becoming increasingly challenged by circumstances and events having an International Impact.”

As highlighted before in the introduction, board governance has assumed critical importance and has gained publicity in this era in which economic advancement and integration of capital markets are of great importance. It has been recognized as a leadership process that is vital in maintaining a dynamic balance between the need for order and equality in society, the efficient production and delivery of goods and services, accountability in the use of power, the protection of human rights and freedoms, and the maintenance of an organized corporate framework. 

The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003) requires that every company to be headed by an effective board, which is collectively responsible for the success of the company. The board’s role is to provide entrepreneurial leadership of the company within a framework of prudent and effective control which enables risk to be assessed and managed. The board has to set the company’s strategic aims, ensure that the necessary financial and human resources are in place for the company to meet its objectives and review management performance. The board should also set the company’s values and standards and ensure that its obligations to its shareholders and others are understood and met. All directors must take decisions objectively in the interests of the company.
2.1.1	Pillars of good governance
In all fields of human endeavor, good governance is founded upon the attitudes, ethics, practices and values of the society regarding:
(i)	Accountability of power based on the fundamental belief that power should be exercised to promote human well-being.
(ii)	Democratic values in respect of the sharing of power, representation and participation.
(iii)	The sense of right and wrong, what is fair and just, work ethics, technology and continuing corporate social responsibility.
(iv)	Efficient and effective use of resources for the production of goods and services.
(v)	Protection of human rights and freedoms and the maintenance of essential order and security for the person and his/her property.
(vi)	Recognition of the government as the only entity to which the society gives authority to use coercive power to maintain public order and national security, collect taxes, reallocate society’s resources to meet public needs and to use that coercive power to confisticate assets, deprive a person of liberty or life; but provided always that such power and authority are not used to suppress, oppress and deny basic human rights and freedoms.

These foundations upon which good governance is built form pillars of good governance and they can be put in four categories, viz:
(a)	There must be an effective body responsible for governance separate and independent of management to promote:
(i)	Accountability (leadership that must be ready to account)
(ii)	Efficiency and effectiveness (hence leadership for results)
(iii)	Probity and integrity (hence leadership that is honest, faithful and diligent)
(iv)	Responsibility (hence leadership that is capable, responsible, representative and conscious of its obligations)
(v)	Transparent and open leadership with accurate and timely disclosure of information relating to all economic and other activities of the corporation.

(b) There must be an all-inclusive approach to governance that recognizes and protects the rights of members and all stakeholders – internal and external.
(c) The institution must be governed and managed in accordance with the mandate granted to it by its founders and society and take seriously its wider responsibilities to enhance sustainable prosperity.
(d) The institutional governance framework should provide an enabling environment within which its human resource can contribute and bring to bear their full creative powers towards finding innovative solutions to shared problems.







The argument has been advanced time and again that the governance structure of any corporate entity affects the firm’s ability to respond to external factors that have some bearing on its performance. In this regard, it has been noted that well governed firms largely perform better and that good corporate governance is of essence to firms. Due to this the subject of corporate governance has dominated the policy agenda in both developed and developing market economies for sometime especially among very large firms. Subsequently, the concept gradually warmed itself to the top of policy agenda in the African continent. 
	
Becht et al. (2002) identifies a number of reasons for the growing relevance of corporate governance, which includes the world-wide wave of privatization of the past two decades, the pension fund reform and the growth of private savings, the takeover wave of the 1980s, the deregulation and integration of capital markets, the 1997 East Asia crisis and other series of economic changes facing the investment world.

It is believed that good governance generates investor goodwill and confidence and poorly governed firms are expected to be less profitable. Claessens et al. (2003) posits that better corporate framework benefits firms through greater access to financing, lower cost of capital, better performance and more favourable treatment of all shareholders. They argue that weak corporate governance does not only lead to poor firm performance and risky financing patterns, but are also conducive for macroeconomic crises like the 1997 East Asia crisis. Other researchers contend that good corporate governance is important for increasing investor confidence and market liquidity (Donaldson, 2003). 

The performance of any board of directors i.e. its efficiency; depends on a number of factors which form the characteristics of a board and these include the board composition, board size, the presence of board committees and the CEO-board relationship. These factors can be used to measure the efficiency of a board of directors and will be considered in this study. According to Carter and Lorsch, (2004) these factors, often referred to as the best practices, are focused around;
(i)	The need for boards to have a majority of independent directors;
(ii)	The need for a board leader who is not the principal or owner of the school (in other companies chief executive officer, CEO);
(iii)	The need of independent directors, rather than the principal or owner of the school, to control the process of directors’ appointment and recommendation to the shareholders;
(iv)	the requirement for boards to have at least three core committees- audit committee, compensation committee and nomination committee - the members of which should all be independent directors.
(v)	The need for independent directors to meet periodically alone without the CEO/owner of the school or other executive directors;
(vi)	The need for boards to be as small as possible;
(vii) The expectation that boards will carry out certain activities that are scheduled into their annual agenda, which provide a clear signal that the board is in charge of overseeing the CEO/principal and the company’s management; and
(viii) The need for directors to be compensated through means that motivate them to focus upon maximizing shareholder value.

The effects of the board characteristics i.e. the board composition, board size, the presence of board committees (board structure) and the CEO-board relationship on the performance of the board have been addressed by different researchers and varying findings have been reported and are briefly discussed here under.

(i)	Board composition
The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003) clearly stipulates that the board should include a balance of executive and non-executive directors (and in particular independent non-executive directors) such that no individual or small group of individuals can dominate the board’s decision taking. To ensure that power and information are not concentrated in one or two individuals, there should be a strong presence on the board of both executive and non-executive directors. For the board to be independent, except for smaller companies, at least half the board, excluding the chairman, should comprise of non-executive directors.

A smaller company should have at least two independent non-executive directors. One of the independent non-executive directors should be the senior independent director and he should be available to shareholders if they have concerns of which contact through the normal channels of chairman, chief executive or finance director has failed to resolve or for which such contact is inappropriate.
 The board should identify in the annual report each non-executive director it considers to be independent. The board should determine whether the director is independent in character and judgment and whether there are relationships or circumstances which are likely to affect, or could appear to affect, the director’s judgment. The board should state its reasons if it determines that a director is independent notwithstanding the existence of relationship or circumstances which appear relevant to its determination, including if the director:
(i)	Has been an employee of the company or group within the last five years;
(ii)	Has or has had within the last three years, a material business relationship with the company directly or as a partner, shareholder, director or senior employee of a body that has such a relationship with the company;
(iii)	Has received or receives additional remuneration from the company apart from a director’s fee, participates in the company’s share option or a performance-related pay scheme, or is a member of the company’s pension scheme;
(iv)	Has close family ties with any of the company’s advisers, directors or senior employees;
(v)	holds cross-directorship or has significant links with other directors through involvement in other companies or bodies;
(vi)	 Represents a significant shareholder; or
(vii) Has served on the board for more than four years from the date of their first election.
The Board composition was shown to be an important factor to both the performance of the board in safeguarding the interests of the shareholders and to investors in a survey conducted by McKinsey & Company (2002). The variables considered in board composition included the percentage of outside directors, the percentage of independent directors, the percentage of director stockholdings (i.e. stock options) and frequency of formal director evaluations. The McKinsey Global Investor Opinion Survey shows that 15 percent of European institutional investors consider corporate governance as more important than a firm’s financial issues, such as profit performance or growth potential. Additionally, the report indicates that 22 percent of European institutional investors are willing to pay an average premium of 19 percent for a well-governed company. 

(ii)	Board committees
Different governance literatures require that the board of directors be composed of committees to assist the board in performing its duties. The recommended committees are audit committee, nomination committee, compensation/remuneration committee, governance committee, executive committee, strategic committee, etc. The board committees are supposed to be independent as independence of these committees is considered to be important for them to be effective monitors (Klein, 1998). John and Senbet (1998) report empirical evidence showing that the presence of monitoring committees (audit, nomination and compensation committees) is positively related to factors associated with the benefits of monitoring. However, the presence of insiders in the compensation committees increases the probability of making decisions in favour of the principal’s/CEO’s interest. Moreover, when the principal/CEO sits on the nominating committee or when no nominating committee exists, firms appoint fewer independent outside directors and more gray outsiders with conflicts of interest (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). In addition, the stock market’s reaction to appointments of independent outside directors is more positive when the director’s selection process is viewed as relatively independent of principal/CEO involvement. Klein (2002) shows that independent audit committee reduce the likelihood of earnings management, thus improving transparency. Finally, when the principal/CEO serves on the nominating committee, the audit one is less likely to have a majority of independent directors (Klein, 2002). 

The stipulated roles of the nomination committee include recommending the composition of the board, to recommend the selection of directors on merit and after ensuring independence, to assess the performance of the whole board and the contribution of individual directors and particularly the principal/CEO, to ensure a succession plan for retiring directors and recommend composition of board committees. The code of best practice requires the formulation of a nomination committee which should lead the process of board appointments and make recommendations to the board. A majority of members of the nomination committee should be independent non-executive directors. 

The chairman or an independent non-executive director should chair the committee, but the chairman should not chair the nomination committee when it is dealing with the appointment of a successor to the chairmanship. The nomination committee should also evaluate the balance of skills, knowledge and experience on the board and, in the light of this evaluation, prepare a description of the role and capabilities required for a particular appointment.

Strategic committee’s roles include developing long term strategic plan incorporating vision, mission, goals and objectives of the company and the means to achieve them. On the other hand the roles of Remuneration committee include researching into pay structures so as to remunerate the board adequately. The board’s remuneration is not a matter of voting yes or no at the board meeting, (Sir Adrian Cadbury), it is one that needs careful consideration. 

Audit committee is the most important committee and it is recommended that every board have an audit committee in its structure. Its roles include encouraging strong operating culture; integrity, legal compliance, forthright financial reporting and strong financial controls and risk management; Independent communication with internal and external auditors, ensure accountability of internal and external auditors to the committee and full board, guarantee compliance with GAAP and set Financial Reporting Framework, i.e. IFRS. The Members of the audit committee are required to have the requisite knowledge on finance, capacity for independent judgment and commitment, show high level of integrity, recognition of the role of the committee, knowledge of the company’s “ORCA”, inquisitive, skepticism and constructive thinking.

Audit committee has roles to perform in almost all areas of the company’s performance. It has detailed involvement in financial statements, risk control and compliance, interaction with management, auditors (internal & external auditors), training and resource development of itself and internal audit department, formulation and evaluation of its performance against the charter. An audit committee checks the performance of each section of interest in the company by asking questions like the ones indicated in table 2.1.

 (iii)	CEO/principal - Board relationship
The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003) requires that there should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company between the running of the board and the executive responsibility for the running of the company’s business. No one individual should have unfettered powers of decision.

The chairman is responsible for leadership of the board, ensuring its effectiveness on all aspects of its role and setting its agenda. The chairman is also responsible for ensuring that the directors receive accurate, timely and clear information. The chairman should ensure effective communication with shareholders.

The chairman should also facilitate the effective contribution of non-executive directors in particular and ensure constructive relations between executive and non-executive directors. The roles of the chairman and chief executive should not be exercised by the same individual. The division of responsibilities between the chairman and the chief executive should be clearly established, set out in writing and agreed by the board. If exceptionally a board decides that a chief executive should become a chairman, the board should consult major shareholders in advance and should set out its reasons to shareholders at the time of the appointment and in the next annual report.
Table 2.1: Summary of the functions of Audit Committee 
Section	Questions
Internal control	Is the control culture evaluated?Is management accountability for systems and processes evaluated?Are audit recommendations implemented?
Financial reporting	Illustrative questions for reviewing financial statements.Is all published financial information reviewed?
Regulatory, tax and legal matters	Are compliance monitoring systems reviewed?Are regulatory findings reviewed?Is fraud risk considered? 
Business ethics	Is there a formal code of conduct?Are compliance monitoring systems reviewed?
Internal audit	Are the activities and organisations appropriate?Are the internal audit staff qualifications adequate?Is the internal audit department effective?
External audit	Is audit scope and approach reviewed?Are annual audit findings considered?Are performance, fees and independence of auditors considered?
Source: Notes on Corporate Governance by Dr. Mndolwa (OUT 2010)

2.2	Empirical Literature
Nevertheless, empirical studies on board composition in relation to firm performance have shown mixed results. Osma and Noguer (2007) in their study tested whether corporate governance mechanisms promoted by best practice codes are effective in constraining earnings manipulation for a Spanish sample of quoted companies during the period of 1999-2001. They analyzed the association between earnings management and two key aspects of corporate governance, board composition and the existence of board monitoring committees. The results of the study show that board composition significantly determines earnings manipulation practices. However, the main role in constraining such practices is not played by independent directors, as the UK- and the US-based research suggests, but by institutional directors. No correlation is found between the existence of an independent audit committee and earnings management measures. Finally, the existence and composition of a nomination committee affects the role of independent directors in constraining earnings manipulation.

The question of whether or not an effective board should be comprised of a greater percentage of outside directors has been much debated. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) argue that outside directors are selected in the interest of the shareholders, whereas, Core et al. (1999) find no evidence that independent outside directors create a more effective board. Bathala and Rao (1995) argue that a majority of outside directors on the board is not necessarily optimal as firms employ multiple mechanisms to control agency costs in the firm. Kiel and Nicholson (2003) find a positive relationship between the proportion of inside directors and the market-based measure of firm performance. Bhagat and Black (1999) and Klein (1998) suggest that adding insiders to the board may enhance firm performance in some firms. Romano suggests further that independent boards do not improve performance.

Davidson et al. (2005) investigated the role of a firm’s internal governance structure in constraining earnings management. It is hypothesized that the practice of earnings management is systematically related to the strength of internal corporate governance mechanisms, including the board of directors, the audit committee, the internal audit function and the choice of external auditor. Based on a broad cross-sectional sample of 434 listed Australian firms, for the financial year ending in 2000, they found that the presence of a majority of non-executive directors on the board and on the audit committee to be significantly associated with a lower likelihood of earnings management, as measured by the absolute level of discretionary accruals. The voluntary establishment of an internal audit function and the choice of auditor are not significantly related to a reduction in the level of discretionary accruals. Using small increases in earnings as a measure of earnings management, the results also found a negative association between this measure and the existence of an audit committee. 

(iii)	Board size
The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003) requires that the board of directors should not be so large as to be unwieldy. The board should be of sufficient size that the balance of skills and experience is appropriate for the requirement of the business and that changes to the board’s composition can be managed without undue disruption.

Huther (1997) in his study said that the size of the board has been shown to have a material impact on the quality of corporate governance. Empirical evidence suggests that efficiency is reduced by boards that are too large. Huther identified a negative relationship between board size and firm performance and argued that efficiency gains will result for the US firms by reducing the size of their governing boards. Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) also found a negative relation between board size and firm value, indicating that smaller boards are more effective and exhibit better financial ratios since they experience fewer communication and coordination problems. Andres et al. (2005) analyze firms from ten countries in Western Europe and North America and find a negative relationship between firm value and size of the board directors. 

Rahman and Ali (2006) investigate the extent of the effectiveness of monitoring functions of board of directors, audit committee and concentrated ownership in reducing earnings management among 97 firms listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia over the period of 2002-2003. The study employs the cross-sectional modified version of Jones (1991), where abnormal working capital accruals are used as proxy for earnings management. The results reveal that earnings management is positively related to the size of the board of directors. 

Other studies have also shown to support the idea that large boards can be dysfunctional. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) believe that board size proxies for the board’s activity, explaining why smaller board sizes are better than larger ones that may be plagued with free rider and monitoring problems. For example, Yermack (1996) and Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) contend that large boards are less effective and are easier for a principal/CEO to control. The reason is that when a board gets too big, it becomes difficult to coordinate and process problems. Reheja (2005) shows that when a principal/CEO proposes a project, each outside board member incurs coordination and communication cost which increases with number of outsiders on the board. This cost essentially captures the difficulty in decision making as the board size increases. Small boards also reduce the possibility of free riding by individual directors, and increase their decision taking processes.

But there is also a view that larger boards are better for corporate performance because they have a range of expertise to help make better decisions, and are harder for a powerful principal/CEO to dominate. Brickley et al. (1997) in their study of earnings management at large banks report that in approximately 80 percent of US companies, the CEO is also the chairman of the board. They argue that the CEO/chairman duality concentrates power in the CEO’s position, potentially allowing for more management discretion. The dual office structure also permits the CEO to effectively control information available to other board members and thus impede effective monitoring (Jensen, 1993). 
	
Faleye (2003) finds that CEO duality is more likely when insider ownership is relatively large and the board is small. Similarly, Braun and Sharma (2007) examine the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance in family controlled public firms (FCPFs). They find that duality by itself does not influence firm performance in FCPFs. However, their results do indicate that the relationship between duality and performance is contingent on the family’s ownership stake in the firm. When family ownership is low, the separation of CEO and board chairman is beneficial in terms of shareholder returns. Thus, having different persons occupying the CEO and board chairman positions is a useful governance control as the risk of family entrenchment increases.

Using a sample of Egyptian listed firms, Elsayed’s (2007) results indicate that CEO duality has no impact on corporate performance. However, when an interaction term between industry type and CEO duality is included in the model, the impact of CEO duality on corporate performance is found to vary across industries. CEO duality attracts a positive and significant relationship only when corporate performance is low, thus, stimulating increase usage of discretionary accruals to inflate income.

Board governance in non academic and academic institutions has been widely studied and identified as an important condition framework affecting organizational performance and operating efficiency. It exerts a strong influence on resource allocation and impacts on the behaviour and performance of firms, innovative activity and entrepreneurship. Margaret M. Hopkins, Deborah A. O’Neil and Helen W. Williams (2007) in their study of Emotional intelligence and board governance: leadership lessons from the public sector; examined the importance of emotional intelligence in board governance. (Emotional intelligence is the capacity to understand our emotions and manage them effectively, and to understand and effectively manage the emotions of others (Goleman, 1995; Mayer and Salovey, 1997)). 

They examined six core competencies that are universal across the six board practice domains: transparency, achievement, initiative, organizational awareness, conflict management and teamwork and collaboration. They adopted a model for school board effectiveness developed by Smoley (1999) (see table 2.2). The model provides a defined picture of what school board leadership looks like in action, describing six domains of practice; making decisions; functioning as a group; exercising authority; connecting to the community; working toward board improvement and acting strategically.
Table 2.2: Model for school board effectiveness
Practice Domain	Related Indicators
Making decision	- Access and utilize relevant information,- Discuss deliberately- Consider alternative actions,- Work toward consensus
Functioning as a group	- Operate with norms,- Demonstrate leadership- Articulate cohesiveness,- Act on values- Show respect
Exercising authority	- Act with defined roles,- Take initiative- Overrule the superintendent,- Resist pressure
Connecting to the community	- Structure community involvement,- Obtain input- Explain actions,- Facilitate information flow
Working toward board improvement	- Cultivate leadership,- Assess competence- Obtain assistance
Acting strategically	- Address critical issues,- Plan,- Organize,- Consider context,- Evaluate 
Source: Smoley (1999) 






Research design is considered as a plan of action for collecting, organizing and analyzing data with the objective of combining the relevance of research with economy in procedure (Kothari, 2002). Research design adopted in this study is descriptive research design with the aim of maximizing reliability with due concern for economic completion of the research study. Descriptive research design was suitable in this study because actual effect of the performance of the school boards on the teaching-learning processes and the factors affecting the effectiveness of the school boards have not yet been established. The objective of selecting the case study method is to maximize what could be learned within the limited time and resources. This approach enabled the development of a detailed, intensive knowledge about the factors that hinders the effective performance of school boards in Arusha Municipal Council. The analysis of the study assisted in answering the research questions and objectives in a qualitative manner, and was the basis of obtaining empirical evidence and the guiding theory. 

3.2	Area of the Study
The study was conducted in Arusha municipality. Sample schools were selected from all the administrative divisions of the Arusha municipal including Themi, Terati, Kaloleni, Elerai, Ngarenaro, Lemara, Daraja mbili, Unga limited and Sombetini. The Arusha municipality was selected for this study because the region is active both economically and educationally.  
3.3	Population of the Study
The population of the study included all the board members and the present and former principals of all sixteen private secondary schools that are currently present in Arusha municipality. The target population included all 16 private secondary schools, 64 board members and 16 principals of the private secondary schools of Arusha municipality. 

3.4	Sample Size
A sample size of 64 private secondary school board members from sixteen private secondary schools in the region was sampled from the existing pool of secondary schools in the Arusha municipality. 

3.5	Sampling Procedure
Special efforts and care were taken to build a well representative sample. Therefore, schools within the city, sub-urban and rural environments were selected using simple random sampling. Additionally, both single sex and co-educational institutions were included. A list of all private secondary schools in the region was obtained from the Regional Education Officer’s (REO) office. Serial numbers were then given to the schools that were on the list. A sample size of sixteen schools was proportionately selected to include ten schools within the town and six from rural areas. Simple random sampling technique was applied to pick individual schools from a stratum.

 In order to get the number of respondents to be included in each of the sample schools, purposive sampling was used. A sample of four directors and a principal from every school were included in the sample. Both the directors and the principals were supplied with interview schedules and their opinions recorded accordingly.   

3.6	Data Sources
The study used both primary and secondary data. Primary data were obtained by interviewing the directors and principals/headmasters from the sampled schools and secondary data, that included the list of private secondary schools and the names of the principals/headmasters and directors, was obtained from the Regional Education Officer’s office.

3.7	Instruments for Data Collection 
The instruments used for primary data collection in this study were questionnaire and interview. The questionnaire consisted of three sections. Section A sought the respondent’s demographic data. Conceptualizing Lam (2005) and Bogler and Somech (2005) model of contextual variables for demographic data, only closely related information necessary for the study were sought. These include gender, sex and occupation.

Section B sought for issues on key variables in the structure of the board of directors. The questions focused on the number of board members, independence of the board, existence of recommended board committees, the number of members in each committee, qualification of the committee members, the frequency of board meetings and the functionality of the board and the committees. Section C examines the participation/roles performed by each board member and the board committees in the normal running of the schools.
3.8	Validity and Reliability
Validity refers to the accuracy or truthfulness of a measurement. A pre test was carried out to guarantee reliability of the data. This was done using 5% of the targeted sample. After this was done then the study was carried out after correcting the inconsistencies that were noted.  

3.9	Assumptions
The assumptions made when conducting this study are that the sample selected represents the population, the instrument used were valid and that the respondents answered questions in the questionnaire truthfully.

3.10	Data Analysis





4.0	DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
4.1	Overview
This chapter presents the data, analysis, discussion and findings of the results obtained from the study. The results were obtained from a questionnaire which was divided into three sections, i.e. section A for personal information, section B for board composition and section C for board structure. The discussion is done following the categories of the questionnaire and ends up with a comparison between the board governance structure of secondary schools and other institutions that are not academic and the challenges faced by the school directors in dispensing their duties.

4.2       Response rate
The return rate for the interviewee was 62 percent for the principals and 64 percent for directors. Out of the 16 principals that were scheduled for an interview, ten responded while the rest declined the interview and out of 64 directors that were contacted, 40 responded and the rest declined the interview. Table 4.1 below shows the return rate of the people who were contacted and included in the sample and were scheduled for interview.

Table 4.1 Response rate of the respondents
Type of Respondent		Principals	Directors	Total
Number of respondents contacted	16	64	80
Number of respondents who returned questionnaire and attended interviews	10	40	50
% turn over	62%	64%	63%
Source: Field data (2011)
4.3      Profile Information of the Respondents
The profile information of the board members (directors) include age, gender, academic qualification, occupation of the board members other than directorship, professional qualification of the board members, duration in the school board as a board member, mode of appointment to the board, experience in working in academic institutions, experience in board membership and possession of shares in the schools by the board members. The discussion in these areas will assist in answering the first research question and the first specific objective of this study. These parameters can influence the performance of the school boards in different ways as discussed below.

4.3.1	Age distribution of the respondents







Source: Field data (2011)

Table 4.2 above shows the age distribution of directors in private secondary school boards in Arusha municipality. From the table it is evident that majority (87.5%) of the board members are at the age range of 41 and above. Those with the ages near to 40 were found to be teachers who were selected to be board members as representatives of the staff. This implies that not only the owners of private schools know and follow the age criteria for a person to be appointed as a director as stipulated in the Tanzania education act of 1978 (see appendix), but chronologically at this age decision making and managerial skills of many people are at their best due to experience obtained through working in different institutions. This will enhance their ability of supervising and directing school activities and also advising the ministry of education on issues pertaining education. 
4.3.2 Gender of Respondents

Figure 4.1: Gender of respondents who participated in this study (%)
Source: Field data (2011)

Figure 4.1 above shows the gender of respondents who participated in the study. From it we can see that majority of the board members (87%) are males and females are represented at a small percentage (13%). This gender imbalance was more pronounced in schools owned by Muslim institutions, for example in Jaffery secondary school which is owned by Muslims of Shia category there is no any female director in its boards. This indicates that despite the global call for equal opportunity for both males and females in decision making posts, still the response as far as private schools are concerned is not very good.  
4.3.3 Academic qualification of board directors






Source: Field data (2011)

Table 4.3 above shows the academic qualification of the directors of private secondary schools of Arusha municipal. 72% of the directors are university graduates, diploma holders make up 20% of all the directors and those with just secondary education make up 8% of all the directors. This implies that, since educated people know the value of education, the performance of the board members is expected to be at high standards and themselves will act as role models to students. 

4.3.4: Occupation of the board members other than directorship






Source: Field data (2011)
Table 4.4 indicates the occupation of the board members of the private secondary school boards. From the table it is clear that majority of the directors (50%) engage themselves in business and out of the remaining 50% percent, (39%) are employed and 11% are both employed and are also business people. This can be attributed to the fact that Arusha is a very active city as far as business is concerned and to the side of board performance this ensures high efficiency because, since the directors have other sources of income, they can not be easily bought by the owners of the schools or school principals in the way of allowances or salaries. 
4.3.5	Professional qualification of the directors

Figure 4.2 Professional qualifications of directors
Source: Field data (2011)

The statistical data below represents the professional qualification of directors of the private secondary schools in Arusha municipality. The data shows that almost all fields of specialization are equally represented in the school boards.
4.3.6	Duration in the Board
Duration of the board members in the respective school boards depend on the age of the school and effectiveness of the board member in fulfilling his/her duties as a director. The education act of 1978 requires a director to be in service for a period of 4 years. The results as shown in table 4.5 below indicate that the majority (60%) of the board members have been in position since they were appointed regardless of the number of years they have saved. This was found to be caused by the relationship existing between the owner of the school and the directors as this was seen mainly to the board members who have been selected by the school owners. This behaviour should be discouraged as it violates the education act of 1978 and prevents the possibility of getting new ideas from the incoming new directors. It also promotes the dominance of the owner of the school and enables him to control the board thus reducing its effectiveness in monitoring school activities.








Source: Field data (2011)

4.3.7	Mode of Selection to the Board
Table 4.6: Selection of the board members
Mode of Selection	Frequency	Percentage




Source: Field data (2011)
The data in Table 4.6 above shows that the majority of the board members, (72%) became board members by their names being proposed by the owner of the schools, 12% were selected by the REO and 16% were board members due to their position in the institutions i.e. as headmasters or teachers. This is in accordance with the education act of 1978 but it has a limitation in that it gives more powers to the owner of the school to control the board. This is not a good practice as it weakens the independence of the directors and thus reducing the effectiveness of the corporate governance in schools. The ministry of education thus should review this preposition in the education act as it is not contributing much to the promotion of effective governance which could otherwise result into improved schools and better performance of students attributed by proper supervision offered by the directors.

4.3.8	Experience of Working in School
Table 4.7: Number of Directors with experience of working in schools
	Frequency	Percent
Directors who were teachers	5	13
Directors who have worked in schools but not as teachers	0	0
Directors who have not worked in schools before	35	87
Total	40	100
Source: Field data (2011)

Table 4.7 above presents the number of directors who have worked in an academic institution before. Significantly big proportion (about 87%) of the directors has never worked in a school before, and the remaining percentage (about 13%) has worked/are still working in schools specifically as teachers. Also it has been seen that there are fewer conflicts and relatively better students’ performance in those schools whose owners have been teachers before. The results show that many schools are governed by people who are not academicians and this explains why many schools are run following industrial ideologies and a lot of conflicts have been reported between the owners and teachers. The owners are taking schools solely as businesses entities and they are not concerned about the human resources management because they don’t know what it takes to be a teacher and they don’t possess in them that fatherly concern of a teacher. So unless schools are run as schools and teachers are taken care of their grievances, the performance of these schools will continue to stagger. 

4.3.9 Experience of Working as a Board Member
Table 4.8: Experience of Board members in Directorship
	Frequency	Percent
Members who have been directors before	7	18
Members who have not been directors before	33	82
Total	40	100
Source: Field data (2011)

Table 4.8 above shows that many directors (82%) have not been board members of other institutions, academic or non academic. This can imply that the exposure and experience in directorship is limited and as running a school is considered to be an easy job, these directors don’t put any effort in trying to find out how other institutions are governed and if those methods can be employed in school governance. The results suggest that before a person is appointed as a board member of a school, its worthy considering his/her awareness in duties of the board of directors as once appointed majority of them don’t take initiatives to update themselves on their duties and it becomes worse as there are no induction courses given to these directors after appointments. 
4.3.10	Shareholding Structure
Table 4.9 Shareholding structure of Board members of School Boards
	Frequency	Percentage
Number of directors with shares	11	27
Number of directors without shares	29	73
Total	40	100
Source: Field data (2011)

The results above show the percentage of directors that hold shares in the schools to which they govern. A significant proportion of directors (27%) do have shares in the schools they govern, and in some schools (e.g Arusha modern secondary school) the board consists of only the shareholders who happen to be related biologically. This can be helpful as it reduces agency problem but prevents inflow of ideas from other people from different cadre.

4.4   Board Composition
The second part of the questionnaire was intended to find information on the composition of the board. The board composition include the number of board members, employment of the directors, frequency of board meetings, meetings of the board members and teachers, the board chairman, independence of the board, and board evaluation,. These factors that have a bearing on the performance of a board are discussed below.

4.4.1   Number of board members
Table 4.10 below gives the figures that represent the number of directors in the private school boards in Arusha municipality. The figures show that majority of the schools have board members ranging from 6 to 12. This is in accordance to the recommendations given by different governance experts that small governing boards are efficient than big boards which have a risk of having free riding board members, also it follows the recommended structure by the education act that a school board should have a total of ten (10) members. When the board members were asked about their opinion on the number of board members, majority (about 90%) said the number is satisfactory.












As indicated earlier in the preceding chapters, the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003) stipulates that the board should include a balance of executive and non-executive directors such that no individual or small group of individuals can dominate the board’s decision taking. To ensure that power and information are not concentrated in one or two individuals, there should be a strong presence on the board of both executive and non-executive directors. Except for smaller companies, at least half of the board, excluding the chairman, should comprise of non-executive directors. Also the education act of 1978, on the non - government school board’s establishment order stipulates that the school board should consist of a total of ten (10) members out of whom only two members should be executive i.e. the head of school who should also act as the secretary of the board and one teacher representing the academic staff of the school.

 The results show that majority of the school boards consist of a good number of non executive directors. This is in accordance to the recommendations given by the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003), the education act of 1978; the non government school board (establishment) order and different researchers. And as explained in the literature review the presence of non executive directors in the board improves the independence of the board and hence its effectiveness.

4.4.3	 Number of meetings held by the school boards
The education act of 1978 directs that the board of non government schools shall ordinarily meet four times a year for transaction of its business at the time and place determined by it and may meet as often as may be necessary (see appendix ). Majority of the school boards hold their meetings between 4 and 6 times a year. Majority of the directors commented that the number of meetings held by the boards is determined by the prevailing situation like the need of employing new staff, the discussion on the examination results, receiving performance report and strategy formulation for the coming academic year. 
 








Source: Field data; 2011

4.4.4 Meeting between board members and school teachers
In all of the schools whose directors were interviewed showed that there are no scheduled meetings between the board members and teachers. This has a negative effect to the performance of the board as it doesn’t receive feedback and opinion of the teachers on the progress of the schools. Teachers being one of the key stakeholders of education and implementers of the development strategies laid down by the board have to be consulted and their opinion recorded.   
4.4.5 The board chairman
Table 4.12: Type of the Board chairman
	Frequency	Percent
Chairman of the board executive director	38	95%
Chairman of the board not executive director	2	5%
Total	40	100
Source: Field data (2011)

From the results in table 4.12 above it is evident that in majority of the private school boards the chairman of the board is executive and it also happens to be the owners of the schools. This is against the recommendations given by the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003), other corporate governance experts and the education act of 1978 that the board chairman should not be an executive director. The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003) requires that there should be a clear division of responsibilities between running of the board and the executive responsibility for the running of the company’s business. No one individual should have unfettered powers of decision.

The chairman is responsible for leadership of the board, ensuring its effectiveness on all aspects of its role, responsible for ensuring that the directors receive accurate, timely and clear information, should ensure effective communication with shareholders, should also facilitate the effective contribution of non-executive directors in particular and ensure constructive relations between executive and non-executive directors. The roles of the chairman and chief executive should not be exercised by the same person/individual. The division of responsibilities between the chairman and chief executive should be clearly established, set out in writing and agreed by the board. A chief executive should not go to be chairman of the same company.

The existence of a board chairman who is executive or owner of the school has a great impact on the independence of the board. The chairman can willingly hold important information from other board members and this can tremendously affect the performance of the board.

4.4.6 Independence of the School boards
Table 4.13 below shows the responses given by the directors in this study on the independence of their school boards. From it we can see that majority of the board members (about 75%) ranked the independence of their boards as being very good. As discussed before the independence of the board and the board members is a key factor in the functioning of any board. It is one of the key factors that determine the effectiveness of a board of directors.









Source: Field data (2011)
4.4.7    Board evaluation
The recommended practice is that there must be a mechanism to evaluate the board and the chairman. Board members can evaluate themselves on the performance of their duties and the feedback given to the chairman. In this study 80% of the respondents confirmed the absence of evaluation mechanisms in their boards and for those (20%) who said there are evaluation procedures in their boards they ranked it as being not very efficient. The respondents gave a reason of not being aware that there are supposed to be evaluation among the board members but they seem to support the idea of the board members being evaluated. For those with evaluation being done in there boards, they were not satisfied by the way it was conducted. Many times it is done in the way of open voting where members are asked how they see the board during the meetings.






Source: Field data (2011) 	

4.5 Board Structure
The third part of the questionnaire was intended to find information on the structure of the board. The board structure include the presence of board committees and the number of members in each committee, the frequency of committee meetings, the functioning and independence of the board committees, the qualification of the audit committee members and the challenges facing them. The results of the responses given by the interviewees are discussed below.

4.5.1 Board committees








Source: Field data (2011)

As it has been mentioned in the literature review, a number of board committees are recommended to be in the structure of the board, these include nomination committee, audit committee, compensation committee and strategic committee. The functions of each committee have been discussed in the preceding chapters and the importance of their presence in any board can not be overemphasized. The non - government school board (establishment) order of 2002 and the education act of 1978 (No. 25 of 1978) do not say anything on the formation of these board committees. But a number of school boards have formed board committees after recognising their importance in the functioning of the board, but their structures do not follow the ones recommended by the corporate governance experts. This can be attributed to the nature of the institutions which they serve, as these committees are put in place to increase the efficiency of the board. There are new committees, for example academic committee, security and environmental committees which are not seen in the structure of the boards of non academic institutions.

4.5.2	 The number of members in the board committees
The number of members in different board committees was largely influenced by the total number of the board members. The average number of members in each committee is as indicated in the table 4.16 below. From the opinion of the board members, the number of members in each committee was found to be reasonably enough.

Table 4.16: Number of Board members in Board Committees





Source: Field data (2011)

4.5.3	 The frequency of committee meetings
Table 4.17: The Average Number of Committee Meetings per Year
Board Committee	Average Number of Meetings per year.




Source: Field data (2011)
The board committees of the private secondary school boards in Arusha municipal hold on average 2 to 3 meetings per annum. These meetings are necessary for the proper functioning of the school boards because, as discussed in the previous chapters, the board committees act as monitors of the performance of the school boards. As Klein, 1998, John and Senbet, 1998, said the boards of directors should be composed of board committees and the committees are supposed to be independent for them to serve as effective monitors to the performance of the boards. The effectiveness of the board committees as monitors increases with increase in the number of meetings held by these committees. Since the recommended number of board meetings is 4 per year (the education act, 1978), an average of 2 to 3 meetings per year for the board committees is enough to make them effective monitors.

4.5.4	 The chairpersons of the board committees
The recommendations are that the board committees be composed mainly of independent non-executive directors and the chairpersons of these committees should be non executive. As described before, the nomination committee’s role include to evaluate the balance of skills, knowledge and experience on the board and, in the light of this evaluation, prepare a description of the role and capabilities required for a particular appointment. The Strategic committee’s roles include developing long term strategic plan incorporating vision, mission, goals and objectives of the company and the means to achieve them. Remuneration committee’s roles include to research into pay structures so as to remunerate the board adequately and this needs careful consideration. On the other hand, Audit committee’s roles include encouraging strong operating culture; integrity, legal compliance, forthright financial reporting and strong financial controls and risk management; independent communication with internal and external auditors, to ensure accountability of internal and external auditors to the committee and full board, to guarantee compliance with GAAP and set Financial Reporting Framework, i.e. IFRS, and for that case the members of the audit committee are required to have the requisite knowledge on finance, capacity for independent judgment, highly committed and show high level of integrity. Due to the importance of these committees, the chairperson is therefore required to be non executive.

Table 4.18: Chairpersons of the Board Committees







Source: Field data (2011)
From the research (see table 4.18 above) it has been found that majority of the board committees are chaired by the executive director and especially the owner of the school.
This reduces the independence of these committees and affects their monitoring abilities. Thus it is highly recommended that the structures of these boards be revised and be in line with the recommended structures.
4.5.5 The nature of board committees meetings
Table 4.19: The influence of the Chairman on board committee meetings
	Frequency	Percentage
Committee meeting influenced by the chairman	32	80%
Committee meeting not influenced by the chairman	8	20%
Source: Field data (2011)

Table 4.19 above shows the responses given by the board members who participated in this study on whether the chairman has influence on the committee meetings or not. As many of the meetings of the board committees are led by the chairman of the board, who in many cases happen to be the owner of the school, it is obvious that the meetings are influenced by the chairman. This reduces the independence of the board committees and the effectiveness of the committees as monitoring agents.

4.5.6	 Selection of the school head
The selection of the head of the school is one of the key responsibilities of the board’s nomination committee. In the school boards which don’t have this committee this role is performed by the owner of the school.  As it can be seen in table 4.15 above, this happens in 25% of the private schools in Arusha. The effect of this is that the independence of the head is tremendously jeopardized as he become answerable to the owner and not to the board. This also can have a negative effect on the performance of the school as all decisions are made by the owner or under his influence.
4.5.7	 The contribution of the board to the school performance
Table 4.20 Contribution of the school board on school performance
	Frequency	Percentage
School Board Contributes to the school performance	31	78%
School Board does not contribute to the school performance	9	22%
Total	40	100
Source: Field data (2011)

From the results in table 4.20 above, 78% of the directors agree that the board of directors has a big contribution to the performance of school. This is true as the roles of the school board, as per the education act of 1978, include;
(a)	to review and make recommendations to the owner of school in respect of the school for which the board has been established.
(b)	to discuss and recommend on matters within the scope of the education policy in Tanzania and relating to the responsibilities of the owner in respect of the school and make recommendations to the owner on any of those matters.
(c)	advise the Head of school on any matter pertaining the day-to-day running of the school.	 
(d)	advise the commissioner on any matter that may be referred to the board by the commissioner.
(e)	promote better education and welfare of the school.
(f)	ensure that teachers of the school abide by the professional code of conduct.
(g)	ensure that no teacher who has been removed from the Register of Teachers is allowed to teach in the school.
(h)	participate in the selection of students for admission to Form I and Form V; and
(i)	facilitate the formulation of Parents/teachers Association.

Thus the board of directors is a key organ in the structure of the school management and its selection needs keen consideration and once selected it has to be given maximum cooperation in the discharge of its duties. 

4.5.8	 Possession of the financial knowledge by the members of the audit committee
The results of the study showed that 70% of the private school boards in Arusha municipality don’t have audit committee (see table 4.15) and in those which do have, possession of the financial knowledge is not a key qualification for one to be eligible to become a member in the committee. This is against the recommendations given by the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003), other corporate governance experts and the education act of 1978. This can lead to financial mishandling and can cause misunderstanding with the auditors when they visit these schools. The members of school boards interviewed agreed on the need and importance of the members of the audit committee to have financial expertise as they are involved directly on financial matters. 

4.5.9 Challenges facing the performance of the board and board members
There is no work without challenges. The directors concurred with this statement by giving a number of challenges facing their work as directors. Most raised challenges are: 
1. Owners of the schools overruling the board and holding important information from the directors. This makes their work difficult as they can not make a thorough follow up of the school activities without having first hand information on the matter concerned. They had an opinion that the school Boards formed just for the sake of fulfilling the conditions for school registration.
2. Another challenge raised by the directors is that, majority of the board members are not aware of the duties of the directors and are not given induction course when they are first appointed as directors. 





5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Conclusion
This study was done to examine the effectiveness of the board governance of the private secondary schools in Arusha municipality. Specifically, the study aimed at examining the structure of the school boards in terms of the number of members present, their qualifications, the type of committees present and independence of these committees. The Primary data were collected using structured questionnaire, analyzed by using SPSS computer programme and tested using Epi Info software programme. Purposeful multistage sampling technique was used to select schools whose directors have to be interviewed. A sample size of 60 respondents was scheduled for an interview, out of whom only 40 turned up. The secondary data were obtained from the Regional Education Officer’s office. 

The findings of this study show that, the board structure of secondary school boards follows closely the recommended structure of the boards of directors by the education act of 1978 and there slight similarity in terms of structure with the boards of other non-academic institutions. This implies that the level of corporate governance in these schools, judging from the structure, is reasonably good. The results in the study also show that most of the board members are selected by the owners of the schools and this reduces the independence of the board members and thus greatly affecting the performance of the school boards.

 The survey exposed that majority of the school board members do not know their responsibilities and this is contributed much by the selection procedure employed when appointing members of the boards. The Tanzania Education Act of 1978 gives the school owners a responsibility of appointing almost 75% of the board members. The owners then appoint friends and relatives whom they can easily manipulate and control as majority of these schools are established as business entities for profit making and not as service providers.

The study revealed that, many of the school boards don’t have the essential board committees like Audit committee (absent for 70%), nomination committee (absent for 25%) and strategic committee (absent for 100%), and in those boards that possess these committees they were found to be chaired by the owners of the schools. This greatly jeopardizes the performance of these committees and their role in monitoring the progress of these schools and education in general. For example, the absence of audit committee or the presence of one whose members lack financial expertise or the one chaired by the owner of the school means that roles of the audit committee including checking of the financial statements of the school, risk control and compliance, interaction with management, auditors (internal & external auditors), training and resource development of itself and internal audit department, formulation and evaluation of the performance of the organisation can not be performed effectively.
	
Also the results imply that there is no close supervision and follow up on the secondary school’s management structure by the higher authorities like the government through the ministry of education that’s why the school owners get a chance to formulate and override their school boards. This eventually leads to a decline in the standard of education in our country.
5.2	Recommendations
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APPENDEX A: THE NON-GOVERNMENT SCHOOL BOARD (ESTABLISHMENT) ORDER
G.N. No. 302 of 2002
1.	Citation and application
This Order may be cited as the Non-Government School Board (Establishment) Order and shall apply to every non-government school specified in the Schedule to this Order.
2.	Interpretation
	In this Order, unless the context otherwise requires–
	"Act" means the Education Act *;
	"Board" means a School Board;
"the Commissioner" shall have the same meaning as ascribed to it under the Education Act, 1978;
"non-government school" means a school wholly owned and maintained by a person, body of persons or any organization other than the government or local authority.
3.	Establishment of Non-Government School Board
There is hereby established a School Board to be known as the Non-Government School Board for each non-government school.
4.	Composition of School Board
Every board for non-government schools shall have the following members who shall be approved by the Regional Commissioner–
	(a)	four members appointed by the owner of the school;
(b)	three members appointed by the Regional Commissioner upon recommendation of the Regional Education Officer;
	(c)	head of the school;
(d)	the Regional Education Officer or his nominee representing the Commissioner; and
	(e)	one member representing the Academic Staff of the school.

5.	Chairman of School Board
(1)	Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (2) of this paragraph the Chairman of the Board shall be appointed by the owner of the school from amongst members of the Board.
(2)	Neither the Regional Education Officer nor any member of the academic staff shall be the Chairman of the Board.
(3)	The Board shall elect a Vice-Chairman from amongst the members who shall preside in the absence of the Chairman.
(4)	When both the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman are absent from the meeting, members of the Board present at the meeting shall elect a temporary chairman for the meeting.

6.	Tenure, appointment, resignations, casual vacancies etc
(1)	A member of the Board shall hold office for a term of four years and at the end of that period he shall be eligible to be appointed for another term of office.
	(2)	A member of the Board shall cease to be a member if–
(a)	he resigns by giving notice in writing addressed to the appointing authority;
(b)	his appointment is cancelled by the authority that appointed him.
(3)	If any vacancy occurs in the membership of the Board by reasons of death, resignation, incapacity of any member or in any other way, the appointing authority may appoint another person to fill that vacancy, and a person so appointed shall hold office for the unexpired period of office of the member in whose place he or she was appointed and shall be eligible for an appointment for another term of office.
7.	Powers of Non Government School Board
(1)	Every Board shall, subject to the general or specific direction of the Commissioner, have power to dismiss a pupil from a non government school according to any regulation on expulsion or exclusion from schools, made by the Minister in pursuance of the Education Act *.
             (2)	In addition the Board shall have advisory and participatory functions to–
(a)	review and make recommendation to the owner in respect of the school for which the Board has been established;
(b)	discuss and recommend on matters within the scope of the education policy in Tanzania and relating to the responsibilities of the owner in respect of the school and make recommendation to the owner on any of those matters;
(c)	advise the Head of School on any matter pertaining to the day-to-day running of the school;
(d)	advise the Commissioner on any matter that may be referred to the Board by the Commissioner;
		(e)	promote better education and welfare of the school;
(f)	ensure that teachers of the school abide by the professional code of conduct;
(g)	ensure that no teacher who has been removed from the Register of Teachers is allowed to teach in the school;
(h)	participate in the selection of pupils for admission to Form I and Form V; 
(i)	and facilitate the formulation of Parents/Teachers Association.
(3)	The Board shall ensure that staff are employed in accordance with such conditions of service as are in force in relation to the staff and for this purpose the staff shall fall under three categories, namely–
(a)	officers in the service of Government who shall be governed by regulation laid down by Government;
(b)	teachers who are members of the Teacher's Service Commission;
		(c)	other teaching, administrative and subordinate staff.
8.	Submission of Report to the Commissioner
The Board shall at least once a year, submit to the Commissioner through the owner of the school, an annual report of the school for which the Board is responsible.
9.	Records
(1)	The Board shall cause to be provided and kept proper books of accounts and records in respect of–
(a)	the receipt and expenditure of money in the running and other financial transactions of the school;
(b)	assets and liabilities of the school; and shall cause to be made out for every financial year audited accounts including a balance sheet of the school and all its assets and liabilities.
(2)	The Board shall submit a statement of account and such other information in respect of the school for which it is responsible as the Minister may, by writing, request.
10.	Meetings and Secretary to Board
(1)	The Board shall ordinarily meet four times a year for transaction of its business at the time and at places determined by it and may meet as often as may be necessary.
	(2)	The Head of School shall be the Secretary to the Board.
(3)	The Secretary shall in consultation with the chairman convene all meetings of the Board by notice which shall specify the agenda, place, date and time of meeting and the notice shall be sent to each member at his usual address at least fifteen days before the date of the meeting.
(4)	The Secretary shall be bound to convene a special meeting of the Board upon receipt of request in writing in that behalf signed by not less than six members of the Board.
(5)	At any meeting of the school board a decision of the majority of members present and voting shall be deemed to be a decision of the Board and the Chairman shall have a casting vote in addition to his deliberative vote.
(6)	The quorum necessary for the conduct of any business of the Board shall be one half of the total number of the members of the Board.
	(7)	The Board may act notwithstanding any vacancy on its membership.
(8)	Where a Board considers desirable for the transaction of its business, it may invite any person who is not a member of the Board to participate in its deliberation but the person so invited shall not be entitled to vote.
(9)	The Secretary shall keep minutes of its proceedings and distribute them to its members, the owner of the school, the Regional Commission and the Commission.
(10)	Subject to the provision of this Order, the Board may regulate its own proceedings.
11.	Revocation 
	[Revokes the Non-Government School Board (Establishment) Order *.]


APPENDEX B: THE GRANT-AIDED COMMUNITY SCHOOL BOARD (ESTABLISHMENT) ORDER
(Section 38(1))
G.N. No. 303 of 2002
1.	Citation and application
This Order may be cited as the Grant-Aided Community School Board (Establishment) Order and shall apply to every Grant-Aided Community School.
2.	Interpretation
	In this Order, unless the context otherwise requires–
	"Act" means the Education Act *;
	"appointing authority" means the Regional Commissioner;
"Board" means the Grant-Aided Community School Board established under regulation 3;
	"Commissioner" shall have the same meaning ascribed to it under the Act; 
"Community School" shall have the same meaning as ascribed to under the Act; 
"Grant-Aided Community School" means a community school that receives or may receive subvention or grant in aid from the government or local authority;
"Head of School" means the Head of School of a Community Grant-Aided School;
	"Minister" means the Minister responsible for education;
"Regional Education Officer" means any education officer appointed to be in charge of education services in region and includes any person to whom he delegates his duties;
"School Board" means a Board established by this Order responsible for the management, development planning, discipline and finance of a Grant-Aided Community School;
"Teacher/Parents Association" means an association of teachers and parents of a Grant-Aided Community School.
3.	Establishment of School Board
There is hereby established a School Board to be known as the Grant-Aided Community School Board for each grant-aided community school.
4.	Composition of Board
(1)	Every School Board for a grant-aided community school shall have the following members who shall be approved by the Regional Commissioner–
(a)	one member representing the voluntary organization if that school was originally established by that voluntary organization;
(b)	the Regional Education Officer or his representative who shall be a senior education officer in the region;
		(c)	the Head of the School;
		(d)	one member representing the academic staff;
		(e)	four members appointed by the owner of the school;
(f)	two members appointed by the Regional Commissioner upon recommendation of the Head of School.
5.	Chairman of Board
(1)	Subject to provisions of subregulation (2) of this regulation the Chairman of the grant-aided community school Board shall be appointed by the owner of the school from among members of the Board.
(2)	The Chairman of the School Board shall neither the be the Regional Education Officer nor any member of the academic staff.
(3)	The Board shall elect a Vice-Chairman from among the members who shall preside in the absence of the Chairman.
(4)	When both the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman are absent from the meeting members of the Board present at the meeting shall elect a temporary Chairman for that meeting.
6.	Tenure appointment resignations, casual vacancies, etc
(1)	A member of the Board shall, hold office for a term of four years and at the end of that period shall be eligible to be appointed for another term of office.
	(2)	A member of the Board shall cease to be a member if–
(a)	the member resigns by giving a notice in writing addressed to appointing authority; or
(b)	the member's appointment is cancelled by the appointing authority.
(3)	If any vacancy occurs in the membership of the Board by reason of death, resignation incapacity of any member or in any other way, the appointing authority may appoint another person to fill that vacancy, and a person so appointed shall hold office for the unexpired period of office of the member in whose place he/she appointed and shall be eligible for appointment for another term of office.
7.	Powers of Board
(1)	Every Board shall, subject to the general or specific direction of the Commissioner, have power to dismiss a pupil from a grant-aided community school according to any regulation on expulsion or exclusion from schools, made by the Minister in pursuance of the Act.
            (2)	In addition the Board shall have advisory and participatory functions to–
(a)	review and make recommendation to the owner in respect of the school for which the Board has been established;
(b)	discuss and recommend on matters within the scope of the education policy in Tanzania and relating to the responsibilities of the owner in respect of the school and to make recommendation to the owner on any of those matters;
(c)	advise the Head of School on any matter pertaining to the day-to-day running of the school;
(d)	advise the Commissioner on any matter that may be referred to the Board by the Commissioner;
		(e)	promote better education and welfare of the school;
(f)	make sure that teachers of the school abide by the professional code of conduct;
(g)	ensure that no teachers who have been removed from the register of teachers is allowed to teach in the school;
(h)	to receive a report on the selection of pupils for admission to Form I and Form V;
(i)	ensure that the grant-in-aid provided by the government is utilized in accordance with the regulations governing provision of grant-in-aid; and
		(j)	facilitate the formulation of Parent/Teachers Association.
(3)	The board shall ensure that staff are employed in accordance with such conditions of service that are in force in relation to such staff and for this purpose the staff shall fall under three categories, namely–
(a)	officers in the service of Government who shall be governed by regulations laid down by Government;
		(b)	teachers who are members of Teacher's Service Commission;
		(c)	other teaching, administrative and subordinate staff.
8.	Submission of report to Commissioner
The Board shall at least once a year, submit to the Commissioner through the owner of the school, an annual report of the School for which the Board is responsible.
9.	Records
(1)	The Board shall cause to be provided and kept proper books of accounts and records in respect of–
(a)	the receipt and expenditure of money in the running and other financial transactions of the school;
(b)	assets and liabilities of the school; and shall cause to be made out for every financial year audited accounts including a balance sheet of the school and all its assets and liabilities.
(2)	The Board shall submit statements of accounts and such other information in respect of the school for which it is responsible as the Minister may, by writing, request.
	(3)	Submit annual report to Regional Commissioner.
10.	Meetings and Secretary to Board
(1)	The Board shall ordinarily meet four times a year for the transaction of its business at the time and at places determined by it and may meet as often as may be necessary.
	(2)	The Head of School shall be the Secretary to the School Board.
(3)	The Secretary shall in consultation with the Chairman, convene all meetings of the Board by Notice which shall specify the agenda, place, date and time of meeting and such notice shall reach each member at his usual address in time at least fifteen days before the date of the meeting.
(4)	The Secretary shall be bound to convene a special meeting of the Board upon receipt of request in writing in that behalf signed by not less than six members of the Board.
(5)	At any meeting of the school a decision of the majority of members present and voting shall be deemed to be a decision of the Board and the Chairman shall have a casting vote in addition to his deliberative vote.
(6)	The quorum necessary for the conduct of any business of the Board shall be one of half of the total number of the members of the Board.
	(7)	The Board may act notwithstanding any vacancy in its membership.
(8)	Where a Board considers desirable for the transaction of its business, it may invite any person who is not a member of the Board to participate in its deliberation but the person so invited shall not be entitled to vote.
(9)	The Secretary shall keep minutes of its proceedings and distribute them to its members, the owner of the school, the Regional Commissioner and the Commissioner.




APPENDEX C: THE GOVERNMENT SCHOOL BOARD (ESTABLISHMENT) ORDER
(Section 38(1))
G.N. No. 304 of 2002
1.	Citation and application
This Order may be cited as the Government School Board (Establishment) Order and shall apply to every Government School.
2.	Interpretation
	In this Order, unless the context otherwise requires–
	"Act" means the Education Act *;
	"appointing authority" means the Regional Commissioner;
	"Commissioner" shall have the same meaning ascribed to it under the Act; 
"Government School" means directly maintained by the Ministry of Education and a Local Authority;
"Head of School" includes the Principal of any Teachers Training College for which a School Board has been established;
	"Minister" means the Minister responsible for education;
"Regional Education Officer" means any education officer appointed to be in charge of education services in a region and includes any person to whom he delegates his duties;
"School Board" means a Board established by this Order responsible for the management, development, planning, discipline and finance of a Government school;
"Teacher/Parents Association" means an association of teachers and parents of a Government school and parents.
3.	Establishment of School Board
There is hereby established a School Board to be known as the School Board for each Government school.
4.	Composition of School Board
Every School Board for a Government school shall have the following members who shall be approved by the Regional Commissioner–
(a)	one member representing the voluntary organization if that school was originally established by that voluntary organization;
(b)	the Regional Education Officer or his representative who shall be a senior education officer in the region;
	(c)	the Head of the School;
	(d)	one member representing the academic staff;
(e)	not more than five members appointed by the Regional Commissioner upon recommendation of the Regional Education Officer;
(f)	two members appointed by the Regional Commissioner upon recommendation of the Head of School; and
	(g)	two members co-opted by the Board during its first sitting.
5.	Chairman of School Board
(1)	The Board shall elect its Chairman among the members specified under paragraph 4(1)(e):
Provided the Chairman of the School Board shall be neither the Regional Education Officer nor a member of the academic staff of the school.
(2)	The Board shall elect one of the Board members to be Vice-Chairman who shall preside whenever the Chairman is absent, provide that there shall be neither a REO nor a member representing the academic staff.
	(3)	The Chairman shall preside at all meetings of the Board.
(4)	In the absence of both the Chairman, and the Vice-Chairman the members present shall elect among themselves a temporary Chairman to preside over the meeting.
6.	Tenure of office, resignations, casual vacancies
(1)	A member of the School Board shall hold office for a term of four years and may be eligible for another further term.
	(2)	A member of the School Board shall cease to be a member if–
(a)	he resigns by giving a notice in writing addressed to the nominating or co-opting authority;
(b)	he has moved to another region or the appointing authority has revoked his appointment; and
		(c)	he dies or is permanently incapacitated.
7.	Meetings and procedure
(1)	The School Board shall hold its meetings four times a year but shall have the right to meet more than four times when necessary.
	(2)	The Head of School shall be the Secretary to the School Board.
(3)	The Secretary shall notify each member within not less than 15 days the date of the meeting.
(4)	The Secretary shall convene a special meeting of the Board upon receipt of request in writing in that behalf signed by not less than six members of the Board.
(5)	At any meeting, a decision by the majority of members present shall be upheld and the Chairman shall have a casting vote in addition to his deliberative vote.
(6)	A meeting shall be unlawful if the quorum has less than one half of its members.
(7)	A Board may invite any person to its meetings for proper deliberations of proceedings but such a person shall not be entitled to vote.
(8)	The Secretary of the School Board shall keep minutes of its proceedings and distribute them to its members, the Commissioner and the Regional Commissioner.
(9)	The School Board may formulate its own regulations for proper conduct of its proceedings.
8.	Functions of the School Board
	(1)	The School Board shall have management and supervisor powers to–
(a)	review and direct the Head of School in respect of the management development, planning, discipline and finance for the school of which the Board has been established;
(b)	discuss matters related to implementation of education policy in Tanzania and make recommendations to the Commissioner as appropriate;
(c)	direct the Head of School on any matter that may be referred to the School Board by the Commissioner;
(d)	advise the Commissioner on any matter that may be referred to the School Board by him;
		(e)	promote better education and welfare of the school;
(f)	initiate projects and programmes for the general progress of the school and do any other activities within its capacity;
(g)	solicit contributions, donations, and engage in income generating activities for the development and welfare of the school;
(h)	ensure that the teachers of the school abide by the code of professional conduct as stipulated under the Teachers Service Commission Regulations, 1989;
(i)	suspend any teacher on disciplinary grounds, misconduct or inefficiency or any act likely to cause disharmony in the school and inform the Commissioner immediately of such an action;
		(j)	prescribe the kind of uniform to be worn by the pupils;
		(k)	facilitate formation of a Parent – Teachers Association.
(2)	Subject to the general and specific directions by the Commissioner, the Board shall have the power to suspend or dismiss a pupil on commission of an offence warranting such punishment.
9.	Revocation 




Questionnaire for Board Members
Dear respondent,
This questionnaire is intending to gather information on the composition and structure of the boards of Directors of private secondary schools. The study will be conducted in Arusha were sixteen (16) private secondary schools will be visited and interviewed. The questionnaire is administered by an MBA student of the Open University of Tanzania conducting a study in partial fulfillment of the requirements of MBA. The information being gathered will be treated as confidential and used solely for academic purposes and not otherwise. Please respond correctly to enable the researcher to attain the intended objectives. Your assistance is highly appreciated for the success of this research study. Do not write your name since identity is not required. Communicate to phone number +255 717 393 846 if you have doubts/ would like to get further clarification. 
Kindly fill in the empty spaces and put a tick in front of the answer you have chosen. If requested to comment or explain please do so. 

PART A. PERSONAL INFORMATION
Please tick where appropriate





2.	What is your sex? 
Male				B.	 Female





4.	Apart from being a board member, what other occupation do you engage yourself in?
	Employed			Business		    Retired
5.	What is your professional qualification?
…………………………………………………………………………………




D.	More than 15 years
7.	How were you selected to the board?








9.	Have you worked as a board member for other institutions before?
Yes			No			
If yes which institution?.....................................................................................
10.	Do you have shares with the school?       Yes			   No			If yes how much percentage?.............................................................................

PART B. BOARD COMPOSITION
11.	How many board members are there in your board? …………...
12.	What can you say about the number of members in your board?
A. Not enough
	B. Just enough
	C. More than enough
13.	Are there any members in your board who are employees of the institution/school? 
Yes			No			
If yes how many? (Give a figure)




15.	How often do board members meet and have a discussion with teachers? ..................................................................................................................................
16.	Is the board chairperson an executive director? Yes	                  No
17.	How can you rank the independence of your board?
	A –    Excellent         
	B –   Very good         			       
	C –   Good                 
	D –   Satisfactory
	E –   Not good      			 
18.	Are there mechanisms to evaluate the board?  Yes		  No
If yes, how efficient is the mechanism?.............................................................
If no, what are the reasons?
A.	Not important
B.	No time






19.	Are the following committees present in your board? Please tick if present
	A.	Nomination committee                     
	B.	Audit committee                                  
	C.	Compensation committee
	D.	Strategic committee                    
20.	How many members are there in each committee? Give a figure.
	A.	Compensation committee                
	B.	Audit committee                              
	C.	Nomination committee                             

21.	How many times in a year do these committees meet? Give a figure.
A.	Compensation committee                      
	B.	Audit committee                                                                                         
	C.	Nomination committee                                         
D.	Strategic committee                        
               
22.	To which committee do you belong?
A.	Compensation committee                   
	B.	Audit committee                                    
	C.	Nomination committee  
	D.	Strategic committee                         
	E.	Others 		        Please Specify…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………...……………………
23.	Who are the chairpersons of these committees?
A.	Executive directors		   B.	Non executive directors
C.	Some executive and some non-executive
24.	Are the meetings of the committees influenced by the chairman of the board?
	Yes				No
25.	How is the principal/headmaster/headmistress of the school to which you a member of its board selected?
A.	By the nomination committee
B.	By the executive director                   
C.	By the owner of the school.                  
26.	How is the performance in the national examinations (Form IV or VI) of students of the school to which you are member of its board?  
	A.	Very poor                  
	B.	Poor                              
C.	Satisfactory                   
D.	Good                            
E.	Very good                     
F.	Excellent                    
27.	Do you think the board of directors can contribute/ has contributed to the
 performance of students?  Yes			No
Please elaborate……………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
28.	The principal/headmaster/executive director is a member of which committee?
	Audit committee	     Compensation committee	                 Both
29.	Do the members of the audit committee have financial knowledge?
	Yes				No
30.	Do you think it’s necessary for the audit committee members to have financial knowledge?
	Yes				No	
31.	What challenges do you face as a director that affect the board performance?
a)	…………………………………………………………………………
a)	…………………………………………………………………………
a)	…………………………………………………………………………
a)	………………………………………………………………………











males

Females

Non professionals

Accountants

Lawyers

Teachers

Doctors



